Abstract. We present a query processing scheme in a private data outsourcing model. We assume data is divided into identifying and sensitive data using an anatomy approach [20] ; only the client is able to reconstruct the original identifiable data. The key contribution of this paper is a relational query processor that minimizes the client-side computation while ensuring the server learns nothing violating the privacy constraints.
Introduction
Data outsourcing is a growing business. Cloud computing developments such as Amazon Relational Database Service promise further reduced cost. However, use of such a service can be constrained by privacy laws, requiring specialized service agreements and data protection that could reduce economies of scale and dramatically increase costs.
Most privacy laws apply to data "relating to an identified or identifiable natural person" [6] , data that cannot be directly or indirectly linked to an individual is not restricted. Some laws are even more specific; the U.S. Healthcare laws apply only to identifiable health information [10] . We propose a private data outsourcing approach where the link between identifying information and sensitive (protected) information is encrypted, with the ability to decrypt this link residing only with the client. As the server no longer has access to individually identifiable protected information, it is not subject to privacy laws, and can offer a service that does not need to be customized to the needs of each countryor sector-specific requirements; any risk of violating privacy through releasing sensitive information tied to an individual remains with the client.
We admit that the legal and privacy issues of this model are open to debate (although some laws suggest the appropriateness of this model; U.S. laws applying to educational institutions specifically allow disclosure of "directory information" on an opt-out basis [7] ); such debate is not in the scope of this paper. We propose a data model based on anatomization [20] . This divides data into anatomy groups, separates identifying and sensitive data into two tables, and provides a join key at the group level (see Figure 2 .) We add an encrypted key that does allow reconstructing the record, but the ability to decrypt and reconstruct resides only at the client. Note that this model can support a variety of privacy constraints, including k-anonymity [18, 19] , discernibility/l-diversity [17, 14] , and t-closeness [13] . While the original anatomization paper just considered a single table, extending this to a full relational database has been explored [16] .
This paper presents a relational query processor operating within this model. The goal is to minimize communication and client-side computation, while ensuring that the privacy constraints captured in the anatomization are maintained. At first glance, this is straightforward: standard relational query processing at the server, except that any joins involving the encrypted key must be done at the client; an appropriate distributed query optimizer should do a reasonably good job of this. However, two issues arise that confound this simple approach:
1. By making use of the anatomy groups, and the knowledge that there is an one-to-one mapping (unknown to the server) between tuples in such groups, we can perform portions of the join between identifying and sensitive information at the server without violating privacy constraints, and 2. Performing joins at the client and sending results back to the server for further processing (as might be recommended by a distributed query optimizer) can violate privacy constraints.
We first give the threat model and related work in consequent subsections and then provide definitions and notations for an anatomized database in Section 2. In Section 3, we show how standard relational algebra operations can be performed to lower client-side cost using issue 1. We conclude our paper with Section 4.
Threat Model
In our private data outsourcing model, a data owner (i.e., client) first anonymizes the database such that individually identifiable links are encrypted besides the anonymization of such links. The data owner sends the modified database to a semi-honest third party (i.e., server) to delegate most of the query processing. The server is only allowed to try to infer additional information than that is allowed by the anonymization technique we use and it is assumed not to return incorrect or/and incomplete result, or alter the protocol in an attempt to gain information. Moreover, the server does not modify the database that the data owner sends at the beginning of the protocol.
Related Work
Private data outsourcing also known as database-as-a-service model was first introduced by Hacigumus et al. [9] . They used bucketization over encrypted database that allows the server to partially execute queries on the behalf of the client. There is a yet unmeasured trade-off between efficiency of the system and the privacy of individuals directly related to the size and the contents of each bucket of encrypted values. Although, there has been an effort to address the optimization of this trade-off in [11] , no privacy measurement showing the amount of information leakage is given. However, Damiani et al. [4] proposed another technique that uses hashing for bucketization and encrypted B+ trees for indexing. They give an aggregate metric showing the exposure of the database contents in various adversarial models. However, we note that an aggregate exposure metric fails to ensure the privacy of each individual's identity.
Instead of using encryption, Aggarwal et al. [1] proposed vertical fragmentation to hide functional dependencies from an adversary. They require two non-colluding servers to send each fragment. Another approach described in [3] is to fragment the tables into partitions and have the client store a small partition storing the sensitive values. The rest is stored in the server in plaintext. They prove that finding the optimal partitioning is NP-hard and give a heuristic solution instead.
As far as we know the closest idea to ours is in [12] . They give an l -diverse partitioning scheme based on anatomization [20] for a single table having multiple sensitive attributes. Our work is orthogonal to their work such that we give detailed query evaluation strategies given such an l -diverse partitioning scheme exists for multirelational databases.
Data Outsourcing using Anatomy
As stated before, we assume use of the anatomy model [20] to meet privacy constraints. Making this work for multiple tables does demand extra thought; a solution for this is given in [16] . This paper assumes an anatomized database meeting privacy constraints; we now present relevant definitions and notations (based on [16] ) that we will use in describing query processing. 
Definitions and Notations
where 1 ≤ j 1 ̸ = j 2 ≤ m, E j1 ∩ E j2 = ∅.
Definition 2.2 (l -diversity). A set of equivalence classes is said to be
where S is the sensitive attribute in T , f (v, E j ) returns the frequency of v in E j and |E j | is the number of tuples in E j .
We use a variation of the definition of Anatomy in [20] . where Note that we show a (keyed) hash as the "join key" between the two subtables. We use HMAC [2] for hiding the join links due to the efficiency of cryptographic hash functions; one could also encrypt the key using a standard mechanism (with nonces) or a Probabilistic Encryption method [8] to achieve semantic security. We formally describe this problem below. In Theorem 2.1, we show that the probability of having a collision in the hash values of any equivalence group is negligible which in return proves our model is correct with overwhelming probability. . Then the probability, P, of not having the same Hk(v) value for any v in any equivalence class in QIT updated or SN T can be approximated by using the birthday problem analysis [5] .
Definition 2.3 (Anatomy). Given a
A i ∈ Q T for 1 ≤ i ≤ d = |Q T |, Q T is
Definition 2.4 (Hiding Join Link). Given two tables T 1 and T 2 having the same cardinality and a joining attribute, SEQ in domain
D, mapping T 1 1:1 to T 2 , a function H :k × D → D ′ is
Theorem 2.1 (Correctness). Given QIT , SN T tables each having n tuples and structured as in Definition 2.3, and HMAC with l-bit outputs used for hiding the actual join link between QIT and SN T ; one can construct the original
Considering the current world population and having a tuple for each person in the world, the largest database can hold at most 2 33 tuples. When l = 160 and n = 2 33 and assuming c is a small constant, P ≈ 1.
Privacy Preservation
Given QIT and SN T , a semi-honest adversary can only associate each individual to a sensitive attribute with some probability based on the size of an equivalence class. Lemma 2.1 gives the formulation for this probability. For instance, the probability of the individual represented by the first tuple in Patient QIT in Figure 2 , ⟨Ike, 41, Dayton⟩ , having Cold is 1/2 since |E 1 | = 2 and the frequency of Cold in E 1 is 1 (i.e., f (Cold, E 1 ) = 1) Theorem 2.2. The client cannot safely send any information resulting from a join between identifying and sensitive information back to the server, unless such information would provide no benefit to further join processing.
Lemma 2.1. Given Hk(.) is a cryptographic hash function, the probability that a tuple in QIT, (t[1], . . . , t[d], j, s), matches with a tuple in SNT
Proof. Let QIT and SN T be the anatomization of T such that ∀t 1 ∈ QIT ; ∃t 2 ∈ SN T , (t = t 1 t 2 ) ∈ T and the probability, P ′ , of finding each tuple t from QIT and SN T is 1/k. Then each equivalence class has k items and there are n/k number of equivalence classes in both QIT and SN T where n is the number of tuples in T . Hence there are (k!) n/k possible tables that can be derived from QIT and SN T and at least one of these tables corresponds to the original table T . Let T j i denote each of these possible tables where
th permutation of all equivalence classes except E). Then we get the probability formulas, 
Query Operators
Query processing that operates on only the QIT or SN T sub-tables can be performed at the server without raising privacy issues; it is when these must be combined that we must take care. A simple solution is to operate on each independently, then send the results to the client to decrypt and combine. However, we can often do better. We now detail how relational query operations can be performed in ways that minimize the computation performed on the client. Interested reader may refer to our technical report [15] in which we include all proofs and algorithms that we omit in this paper due to the page limit.
Selection
Selection on a single table T anonymized into QIT and SN T can be broken into selection on QIT , selection on SN T , and selection criteria requiring the join of the two. The single sub-table selections are performed first. The resulting tables are then queried to determine where an anatomization group contains values that could satisfy the cross-subtable criterion. If so, all possible matching tuples from each group are passed to the client, which can decrypt, join, and complete the selection. 
Definition 3.1 (CNF Predicates
)P QIT = P 1 ∧ . . . ∧ P α , P SN T = P α+1 ∧ . . . ∧ P β , P QS = P β+1 ∧ . . . ∧ PP QS = ∧ β<i≤n ( P QIT i ∨ P SN T i )
Definition 3.2 (Server-side Selection Query). Given QIT and SNT tables derived from a table T using Anatomy model anonymization and a set of predicates P in conjunctive normal form defined as in Definition 3.1, a selection query written as σ P (QIT, SN T ) returns two tables, QIT
′′ and SN T ′′ : This process potentially returns a single value from the QIT and SN T from the server to the client, implying to the server that these are linked. The key is to remember that it is quite possible that these values do not join; the query result could be empty. This only becomes a problem if 1) attributes in QIT are correlated with attributes in SN T , and 2) the server knows of this correlation. If attributes are not correlated, then the chance that a single tuple selected from a group in QIT based on a query matches a single tuple from the same group in SN T is 1/k, and the server cannot infer that they match. Even if the values are correlated, if the server does not know of that correlation it must assume the match probability is 1/k. If the server knows of the correlation, then it can infer that the two values match based on the QIT and SN T values alone, without even processing a query.
An issue arises when the server does not know of the correlation, but repeated queries suggest such a correlation. However, these issues are with the decision on how to anatomize the table, not with the query processing mechanism itself -the proposed query processing mechanism reveals only linkages that the server could discover from only the data, queries, and knowledge of correlations.
Projection
Projection is at first glance straightforward, as removing attributes can be done independently on each sub-table. The difficulty comes in removing duplicates: two tuples may be identical in all non-encrypted attributes in QIT (or SN T ), but not be a duplicate in the join.
There is an exception when all values in an anatomy group become identical under projection; then only a single tuple representing the entire group needs to be returned. However, this only works if no selection is performed on "projected out" attributes prior to the projection.
We show how projection operator, denoted by π, is processed in case of eliminating duplicates. We also use π d throughout the paper to denote that the projection operator does not eliminate duplicates. Since calculating π d is straightforward, we show the processing of π instead.
Definition 3.4 (Server-side Projection Query). Given QIT and SNT tables derived from a table T using Anatomy model anonymization and a set of attributes A', projection query without duplicates written as
returns a set of tables, R: 
SN T ,HSEQ (σ GID∈S SN T ); and where R
′ QIT = π A ′ QIT ,GID (QIT ), R ′ SN T = π A ′ SN T ,
GID (SN T ), and S is defined as
S = { i : σ GID=i ( R ′ QIT ) > 1 ∧ |σ GID=i (R ′ SN T )| > 1 }
Lemma 3.2. Given R ′ and S as in Definition 3.4,
R ′ = π A ′ ( σ GID / ∈S ( R ′ QIT R ′ SN T )) = π A ′ (σ GID / ∈S (QIT updated SN T ))R ′′ = π A ′ ( R ′ ∪ π A ′ ( T ′ QIT updated T ′ SN T )) Theorem 3.2. Given A ′ = A ′ QIT ∪ A ′ SN T , QIT ,
and SN T ; R ′′ derived according to Definition 3.4 and 3.5 is equal to π A ′ (T ) if the pair ⟨QIT, SN T ⟩ is an anatomization of table T according to

Join
Join is problematic, as it can be an expensive operation. We detail below a natural join. The key is to push join as late as possible, as it only results in reduction on the sub-tables containing the join criterion (e.g., the QIT subtables); the other sub-tables can only be reduced to the extent that the join eliminates complete anatomization groups. 
Definition 3.6 (Server-side Join Query
⟨R 1 , R 2 , R 3 ⟩ = ⟨Z i Z j , Z k , Z l ⟩ where ∃a : a ∈ A Zi ∩ A Zj and 1 ≤ i ̸ = j ̸ = k ̸ = l ≤ 4.
Group-By
Group-by is challenging, as it is also an expensive operation, but can in some cases be done largely at the server. This is dependent on the type of aggregate being computed. In some cases, an anatomization group may be contained entirely in a group-by group; if so, an aggregate such as M AX need only return a single value for that anatomization group. However, if the values in an anatomization group are split across multiple group-by groups, all tuples must be returned, as the server has no way of knowing which tuple goes in which group.
We now show how to apply this optimization (when all tuples in an anatomization group are in the same group-by group) for several classes of aggregates. 
Definition 3.9 (Auxiliary Function Set). Given an aggregate function set F defined as in Definition 3.8 along with its input set X, an auxiliary function set F
′ is defined such that 
The above group-by query returns a set of tables R based on the grouping attributes
Given R ′ and S defined in Definition 3.11, 
where 
Algorithm 1: The algorithm for∪ operation input : Tables, T Table T 
Conclusions and Further Work
We have shown how given an anatomization of a database that meets privacy constraints, we can store that database at an untrusted (semi-honest) server and perform queries that minimize the load on the client. This frees the server from constraints imposed by privacy law, allowing it to provide a service while avoiding concerns over privacy.
There has been extensive work on storing and processing encrypted data. Our approach is to minimize the encryption, while still satisfying privacy constraints. This provides not only significant performance advantages, but also allows the server to provide "value-added" services. Such services could include address correction and normalization (cleaning individual data) as well as data analysis. Such services provide a more compelling business case for private data outsourcing than an "encrypt everything" approach, while still ensuring that outsourcing does not pose a privacy risk.
As a future work, we will implement the presented query operators and evaluate the performance of our system in a real anatomized database. Moreover, this paper looks only at a fixed database and read-only queries. Insert, update, and delete pose additional challenges, and are also left as future work. Another challenge that arises is data modeling: given a database and privacy constraints, what is the appropriate normalization for an anatomized database?
